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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
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its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5567
This paper contains a critical discussion of the opening of 
the highway concession to the private sector in Italy over 
the past 20 years. It describes the political context, legal 
mechanisms and regulatory settings; offers an analysis of 
the changes in the equity composition of concessionaires 
after the introduction of public-private partnerships, 
quality standards, and tariff dynamics; and provides 
This paper is a product of the Research Support Unit, Development Economics Vice Presidency. It is part of a larger effort 
by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at nlimodio@worldbank.org.  
some examples. The Italian experience reflects the typical 
problems of the “build-now-regulate-later” approach 
recognized in the highway public-private partnership 
literature. The Italian model is also characterized by the 
existence of an overly complex regulatory framework, 
as well as the lack of a single agent in charge of contract 
enforcement and independent data collection.  
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In 1992 the Italian Parliament passed a reform that allows the Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic 
Programming (CIPE-Comitato Interministeriale di Programmazione Economica) to revise fully the highway 
concession system and broadly the transport related programs. The reasons can be clarified by the name of 
this law: “Urgent intervention on public finance.”
2 In fact, both the 1992 Italian financial crisis and the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty had put the government under severe stress to cut public debt and privatize 
its companies. 
 
However, by itself this law did not grant the possibility for private companies to run highways as 
concessionaires. Between 1992 and 1997, the agent in charge of highway creation and management was still 
the government: either through the National Street Enterprise, ANAS (Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle 
Strade), which is 100 percent owned by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), or through 
Autostrade, which was owned by the Italian Reconstruction Institute (IRI), a gigantic public holding, which 
was itself controlled by the MEF.  
 
In addition to the need to cut public debt, in the mid-1990s the government had to react against a 20-year 
ban
3 on highway construction, which had moved Italy away from its innovative transport policy stance of the 
1970s and caused a dramatic infrastructure constraint. Figure 1 reports the evolution of the highway network 
of four large European countries (Germany, Italy, France and Spain).
4 We can see that although in 1970 Italy 
had the second largest network in kilometers, its infrastructure capacity stagnated from 1978 onward, while 
the other European countries achieved impressive gains. Therefore, the necessity to cut public expenditure 
and the need for new investments were the two fundamental reasons behind the opening up of concessions to 
private companies in the highway sector. As Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Treasury Minister between 1996 and 
1998 and President of the Republic from 1999, reported in a meeting at the Italian Parliament in 1997: “the 
fundamental objectives of our privatization program are two (…) first of all, (…) to enlarge, reinforce and 
modernize the Italian market (…) secondly, the privatization program is aimed at reducing public 
expenditure and the stock of national debt.”
5 
 
For this reason, in 1999 the largest highway concessionaire, Autostrade, managing more than 40 percent of 
the total national network, was sold for 7 billion euros (2.5 from a private group, Atlantia, and 4.5 from the 
share market) with a 40 year concession
6 and opened the way to further initiatives. In fact, between 1999 and 
2006 more than 64 percent of the existing Italian highway network was auctioned to private companies, with 
two main private groups dominating the market, as Figure 2 shows. 
   
                                                            
2 Law 498/92 available in Italian only at http://pa.leggiditalia.it/  
3 Article 18bis of Law 492/75 which states that: “it is also suspended the construction of new highways or part of them 
or tunnel for which a tender has not been issued yet”(…è altresì sospesa la costruzione di nuove autostrade o tratte 
autostradali e di trafori di cui non sia stato effettuato l'appalto). 
4 Transport section on the online European statistical database, Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database 
5 Source: Audizione sulle privatizzazioni alle Commissioni riunite Bilancio Finanze Attivi” available on the Treasury 
Ministy website http://www.tesoro.it/documenti/documento.asp?idd=3718# . The reported quotation is the following: 
“l’attività di dismissione del patrimonio pubblico rappresenta uno dei passaggi fondamentali nello sforzo del Governo 
per l’ampliamento, il rafforzamento, e la modernizzazione dei mercati (...) in secondo luogo il programma di 
dismissioni è legato all’obiettivo del contenimento del fabbisogno pubblico e dello stock di debito”. 
6 See http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1999/10/21/privatizzazione-autostrade-volata-solitaria-
di-benetton.html  3 
 
Figure 1: Highway Network Size, by Country 
 






Figure 2: Highway Sector Market Structure 
 
 
Source: Benfratello et al. (2006): others refer to highways managed directly by public authorities at the 
national or regional level. 
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How Does the Highway Concession System Work? 
 
The Italian legal public-private partnership (PPP) framework has evolved erratically over the years. Several 
laws have attempted to find a balanced position regarding the regulation and incentives between the parts 
(concessionaires and the state), but without much success. Only in 2006 were the legal principles regarding 
the infrastructure concessions grouped in Law 163/2006, which gave birth to a definitive act. The creation of 
a highway concession requires four steps. The first step involves adjudicating the concession via a 
competitive auction called by a region or ministry.
7 The second step involves an evaluation of the call by the 
technical body of the CIPE (NARS - Nucleo di consulenza per l'attuazione delle linee guida sulla regolazione 
dei servizi di pubblica utilità). Third, the CIPE and the Parliament need to approve it. And fourth, the 
highway concession is ready to start.
8 ANAS is required to supervise the respect of the concessionaires’ 
contract and pass important information to the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation (MIT). In case 
the concession is not respected, the law imposes to ANAS the contract enforcement, either with formal 
warnings or with fines ranging between 25.000 and 150 million euro. Such fines are deliberated by a 
committee appointed by the President of ANAS, which has to inform the MIT of any decision and develop a 
detailed report which is due to the concession provider and franchiser. In addition to these, ANAS can 
propose to the MIT to suspend or stop the concession should the franchise holder fail to meet its obligations 
and temporarily replace the concessionaire by managing directly that particular highway. 
 
Box 1. A one million euro fine.  In December 2005, ANAS fined the concessionaires of the highways"A6" 
(Torino-Savona), "A26" (Voltri-Gravellona – Toce) and "A 7" (Milano-Genova) a total amount of one 
million euro.
9 The reason for the most important fine ever issued by ANAS was the break of the concession 
contract: at the beginning of December a remarkable snowfall had blocked the three highways, and the 
franchise holders were unable to implement an effective recovery plan. In fact, despite a “highway blockage” 
issued by ANAS, not only had these groups not placed any significant restriction against trucks (the most 
sensitive and potentially dangerous means of transportation involved), but they had also allowed cars to enter 
the highways, although they were impossible to navigate, and did not provide an alternative route. In 
addition to these problems, most of the concessionaires were incapable of offering assistance to passengers, 
many of whom were stranded in their cars and surrounded by snow. For all of these reasons, ANAS pledged 
to avoid such poor service in the future. 
 
By law, the highway concession is assigned via an open, competitive auction in which the competitors are 
guaranteed with a fidejussione, which is a bond stating the financial responsibilities of the concessionaire and 
generally covering 2 percent of the contract.
10 There are also other requirements, such as registration for 
building companies (iscrizione all’ordine professionale), quality certificates (UNI EN ISO 9000 etc.) and 
other technical criteria (experience, previous contracts, number and qualification of its labor force). The 
auction selection principle is either that of the lower price or the most convenient offer criterion (criterio 
dell’offerta economicamente più vantaggiosa) established through an index of different parameters (price, 
quality, technical implementation, aesthetic and functional characteristics, environmental impact, etc.). The 
variables and weights in this index are specific in each auction and can change according to the preferences 
of the concession provider. However, in each auction, there must be a broad classification between 
                                                            
7 The public authority responsible for the concession varies according to the relative importance of the infrastructure. In 
fact, the Italian Constitution regards infrastructures as a matter of joint responsibility and as a result the so-called 
strategic national infrastructure (Grandi Opere) is managed at the national level, while infrastructure important at the 
regional level is managed by decentralized authorities (or ANAS), as are the concessions. 
8 This procedure is explained in articles 82, 83 and 84 of the Italian Law D.L. 262/2006. 
9 http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2005/12/28/autostrade-multa-milionaria.html  
10 By law, if a company presents quality certificates, such as UNI EN ISO 9000, it can be allowed to participate in the 
auction with a 1 percent fideiussione. 5 
 
qualitative and quantitative elements; each can contain specific sub-criteria, but their sum must be 100 and 
each must be weighted between 40 and 60 percent. 
 
Box 2.  Bidding variables in different auctions.  Most general principles but only few rigid criteria of the 
auction mechanism are defined by law. For this reason, regional authorities are empowered to shape the 
bando di gara (call for concession) according to their own specific requirements. We will compare two calls 
and show the differences in the criteria introduced and the relative weights given to each. The two calls are 
for the same type of contract (build-operate-transfer, BOT) in two close regions (Lombardy and Veneto) and 
at similar times (2007 and 2006 respectively). Although the total investment considered by the concession is 
high in both cases, there is a substantial difference in degree (780 million and 2.5 billion euros) and an even 
more surprising difference in the bidding variables and their weights. 
 




Sub-criteria  Points    Veneto BOT  Sub-criteria  Points 
Qualitative  
elements 
  40    Qualitative 
elements 
  40 
Quantitative 
elements 
  60      Quality of raw material and 
material duration 
(15) 
  Price  (35)      Environmental and aesthetic 
characteristics 
(10) 
  Building time  (15)      Project management  (10) 
  Amount of 
initial private 
financing 
(10)      User safety characteristics  (5) 
        Quantitative 
elements 
  60 
          Duration of free-of-charge 
access for residents in the 
local area 
(10) 
          Building time  (8) 
          Amount of public subsidy in 
the capital account 
(21) 
          Amount of public subsidy in 
the current account 
(21) 
                                                            
11 The two auctions are classified as 2007/S 137-168844 for Lombardy and 2006/S 205-218224 for Veneto. The calls 
are available at the TED (Tenders electronic daily) supplement of the Official Journal of the European Union at the 
following webpage http://ted.europa.eu/    6 
 
Source: TED (Tenders electronic daily). Supplement of the Official Journal of the European Union. 
 
In these two auctions, we can perceive how much freedom the law provides regional administrations and at 
the same time how general or strict their auction requirements can be. In fact, although in both projects the 
quantitative and qualitative weights are assigned equally, the sub-criteria are very specific and binding for 
the competitors in Veneto, while the same sub-criteria are fairly general in the case of Lombardy, in which 
only the main variables are cited and the competitors are free to elaborate on different projects. In this case, 
we can clearly distinguish between a highly regulatory and a more operational approach to the concession 
call. 
 
Highway Concessions  
 
Fifteen highways were concessioned after 1999 and currently 4,359.4 km of the 6,825.3 km national network 
are under concession to two private groups. These are Atlantia, headed by the Benetton family and grouping 
several Italian banks and entrepreneurs, and the Atm holding, headed by the Gavio family and grouping 
other private companies. These two manage, respectively, seven and eight highways each, although Atlantia 
is by far the largest company, as it has been controlling the whole Autostrade group since 1999 (which by 
itself includes concessions on 2,854.6 kilometers) and automatically obtained a dominant position in the 
market. 
 
Each highway concession is managed by a specific on-purpose-created company. This is part of the larger 
group, either totally or partially because other private or public companies own its shares. Table 2 reports the 
average equity composition of the companies managing the highway concession and distinguishes between 
the shares possessed by the main group (the group column), those possessed by the regions or other national 
authorities (ministries or sub-regional ones), by ANAS or by public or private agents that own some shares 
but do not enjoy any decision-making power. The figures in Table 2 are reported both for the year 1992 
(before the concession, when every highway was publically managed) and for 2005 (when 64 percent of the 
network was concessioned). 
 






Average % ownership in 2005  Average % ownership in 1992 
Group  Regions  ANAS  Other  Group  Regions  ANAS  Other 
Atlantia Group (7)  3402.3  74.3  6.7  0  0.8  67.7  6.9  14  3.9 
Atm Group (8)  957.1  74.5  14.9  4.5  0.3  12.7  37.6  5  2.52 
Direct Public 
Control (7) 
1252.8  0  81.8  0  14.3  0  82.7  0  3.3 
ANAS  1213.1  0  0  100  0  0  0  100  0 
                   
 
Source: Benfratello et al. (2006).  Group refers to the concession holder; regions refer to regional and other 
local public authorities involved in the highway ownership; ANAS is the public company managing highways 
and other public streets owned 100 percent by the Ministry of Economy and Finance; and other refers to 7 
 
share  ownership  by  a  private  group,  a  region  or  ANAS,  which  does  not  involve  control  over  the 
management. The remaining percentage of ownership is on the share market. 
 
It is surprising, yet not unexpected, that since 2005 there have been average equity composition changes only 
for auctioned highways. The private groups have reinforced their control and significantly dismantled the 
presence of the public authority at the regional/direct public level, and especially have phased out ANAS. 
The reasons for this move are to be found in the private concession mechanism, but also and mostly in the 
new power of ANAS. It is still a fully public company, yet ranges from highway management to control, 
tariff regulation and contract enforcement. In fact, up to 1999, ANAS was mostly managing highways. But 
after the beginning of the concession system, it also acquired the role of regulatory agency under the total 
share control of the MEF and the technical and operational control of MIT. 
 
 
Box 3.  The Auction of Autostrade, the Italian Mass Concession.   Autostrade was a group held by a 
gigantic public holding, IRI, enjoying a traditional concession on more than 40 percent of the national 
highway network. The so-called “privatization” of Autostrade occurred in several steps. First the Parliament 
passed a law creating a 40-year concession to Autostrade.
12 Then IRI issued a call to sell Autostrade. And 
finally, after the sale, IRI was dismantled and its resources were transferred to the MEF. The call to sell 
Autostrade was structured as follows: 70 percent of its shares would be sold on the public stock market to 
individuals and 30 percent to an individual group (nocciolo duro) through a private negotiation. Ten groups 
participated in the auction of Autostrade: Edizione Holding, owned by the Benetton family and some Italian 
banks (who later became Atlantia group), the Spanish highway private company Acesa, the Portuguese 
highway company Brisa, the Gavio group (which controlled the ATM group previously cited), the Australian 
bank Macquarie, the McDonald’s group, two English private equity funds and three other individual 
companies.
13 The MEF selected Macquarie Bank and the Benetton group and allowed them the due 
diligence,
14 choosing the Italian group because of the comparatively more convenient last offer. The plan of 
government regulators forecasted a large private group listed and traded on the market, with broad control 
over its investments and a massive dividend-redistribution scheme to numerous small shareholders. This 
failed in a few years, as in 2003 the Benetton group launched a tender offer on the remaining 70 percent of 
traded shares, quickly passing from 30 to 50.1 percent and establishing total control over the company. 
 
 
Has the concession to private groups increased highway quality? Although it may be difficult to fully 
measure this claim, there are some proxies that can be studied and seem to confirm a significant rise in 
quality and safety standards. If we refer to maintenance expenditure, Figure 3 seems to suggest that the 
highway management has improved, as between 1999 and 2004 both mean and median expenditure on the 





   
                                                            
12 This law and its application have created problems because the independent public authorities dealing with National 
Accounts (Corte dei Conti) and competition (Antitrust) rejected it and were forced by the Parliament to accept a 
prolonged concession. For reference refer to: 
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1998/giugno/02/Autostrade_Antitrust_campo_co_0_98060211313.shtml  
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1998/febbraio/18/Autostrade_vendita_accelera_co_0_9802185056.shtml  
13 http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1999/07/30/corsa-dieci-per-autostrade.html   
14 http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1999/10/19/autostrade-domani-la-scelta-dell-iri.html  8 
 
Figure 3: Maintenance Expenditure
15 
 
Source: Benfratello et al. (2006). The base year for the two series is 1994=100. 
 
In 2007, Autostrade released a report in which several quality and safety indicators were analyzed, in order 
to quantify the private concession’s effect on the service improvement. With the sole exception of the 
mortality rate, which refers to the whole highway system, the other variables are specific for the Autostrade 
concessionaire. We can generally affirm that the quality of infrastructure has increased, because all variables 
included show a remarkable variation between 1999 and 2005. However, because there is no independent 
report measuring the same variables or including quality-oriented indexes, final judgment on the matter must 
be suspended. 
 
Table 3: Quality and Safety Indicators for Autostrade Group
16 
Variable  Unit  1999  2005  2006 
         
Mortality rate  Death/100 Mln km  1.1  0.60  0.60 
Draining paving  Mln m
2  2.6  9.4  13.5 
Network cover with draining asphalt  % total km  16%  55%  69% 
Median strip (annual substitution)  km  0  76  300 
Network cover with qualified median strip  % network  55%  66%  76% 
Electronic information panel at entrance  Number of total panels  102  323  401 
Electronic information panel on  Number of total panels  151  326  355 
Call-center mobility dedicated line  Number of lines  12  120  120 
Source:  Autostrade, 2007, page 21. 
                                                            
15 Source: Benfratello and al, (2006), the base year for the two series is 1994=100. 
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But assuming some quality improvements in the system, at what cost did they occur? There are different 
views about this claim. On the one hand, a large number of customers complain of the steady tariff increase 
and attack the concession system as a way to extract a rent from a natural monopoly: many consumer 
associations claim an “unacceptable tariff explosion.”
17 According to Marco Ponti, former member of 
NARS, “there has been clamorous abnormal profits” and in an interview in the newspaper “La Repubblica” 
in 2003, he claimed that customers have been “shorn like flocks of sheep”
18 (alluding to the fact that the 
Benetton family is mostly involved in textiles). Because of this statement, Ponti was sued by Autostrade for 
10 million euros and forced to resign; public opinion paid a lot of attention to this event. This happened also 
because it reflected a struggle in the government:
19 on the one hand, the MEF was softly supporting Ponti’s 
view and asking for a tariff system reform; on the other hand, the MIT favored Autostrade and a softer 
mechanism. In the end, the MIT won and especially its Minister, Pietro Lunardi. (Box 4 explains why this 
might not be negligible). 
Box 4.  A Minister, a Tunnel and a Company.   In 2002 the former Minister of Infrastructure and 
Transportation, Pietro Lunardi, was involved in an investigation for tender manipulation (turbativa d’asta) in 
a concession for the reorganization of Monte Bianco tunnel.
20 This route was considered to be particularly 
dangerous because of fragile safety standards. For this reason, the contract aimed to prevent further accidents 
and effectively restructure the tunnel. The tender had attracted two companies: Scetauroute-SPEA, part of 
the Autostrade group, and Rocksoil, owned and managed by Lunardi, through its family. SPEA won the 
tender but sub-contracted the largest part of the design and implementation to Rocksoil. The CEO and 
technical chief of the local concessionaire RAV (Raccordo Valle d’Aosta), Vincenzo Pozzi, supervised the 
project and agreed on its operational execution, including the cost explosion (+50 percent with respect to the 
original contract), which was supported by Lunardi himself (as Minister and President of the technical 
commission on the disasters in the tunnel). As four MPs declared in a parliamentary session in 2001,
21 the 
cost increase was largely responsible for an enormous increase in the remuneration of SPEA and especially 
Rocksoil. What is more, after two years, Mr. Pozzi was nominated by the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Transportation Lunardi (in agreement with the MEF) Emergency Commissar of ANAS,
22 who replaced the 
previous president and took his responsibilities in supervising concession contracts, their implementation and 
execution until a new president was designated. This generated multiple conflicts of interest: Pozzi was head 
of the institution (ANAS) that was supposed to direct and control the private company he was managing 
(RAV); Lunardi had appointed the president-in-chief (Pozzi) of the institution (ANAS) that should have 
supervised and eventually denounced his own company (Rocksoil) for the inexplicable relations with SPEA; 
and, last but not least, Autostrade directly participated in the business of the Minister (Lunardi), who had the 
most important role in choosing between alternative highway tariff systems, which would directly involve 
Autostrade. Although Lunardi was neither investigated nor sentenced for any crime, this event shows the 
                                                            







21  Minutes of the Italian Parliament meeting number 059 on the 05/11/2001, 
http://www.parlamento.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Resaula&leg=14&id=00008977&part=doc_dc-
allegatob_ab-sezionetit_icrdrs&parse=no&stampa=si&toc=no  
22 Mr. Pozzi was appointed Commissar of ANAS, because in so doing the Parliament would not vote on its nominee 
(newspapers report that the Parliament was against this candidate also because of the pressure Lunardi had placed on 
the previous President to resign). In fact, the Law imposes that the President of ANAS to be chosen between the MEF 
and MIT, in accordance with the Parliament. 
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2001/ottobre/19/All_Anas_commissario_Lunardi_rivolta_co_0_011019652.shtml  10 
 
fragility of the mechanisms governing public sector works and the difficulty in controlling for multiple 
conflict of interests. 
Concessionaires led by the Autostrade group try to block any government intervention aimed at the 
introduction of a more harmonious tariff system. In 2006 Autostrade provocatively threatened to sue the 
government and ask for compensation in case a new tariff law would be enacted.
23 
Nevertheless, statistical data on this subject are less univocal. As Figure 4 shows, the evolution of the tariff 
before and after 1999 (the dotted line) does not seem to show a significantly different trend, although from 
2003 onward tariffs seem to be growing more than inflation.  
 
However one possible explanation may be given for the “tariff rage” of both concessionaires and users. 
Before 1999, tariffs were linked to the highest one imposed by Autostrade, so the whole network would have 
a nationally-fixed tariff system, either directly or through shadow-tolls. After 1999, a new system was 
introduced, which linked the tariff applied on each highway both to general aggregates (inflation) and to 
concession-specific variables (quality and productivity). For this reason, the geography of the highway tariff 
has evolved unevenly since 1999. This may also explain consumer aversion and the haste against the new 
concession system. 
 
Figure 4: Tariff and Inflation Rate Evolution
24 
 
Source:  Italian Statistical Institute, ISTAT. Inflation refers to variation in the consumer price index (CPI); 
the base year for the two series is 1995=100. 
 
 
Other transport economists, such as Marco Ponti (Ragazzi and Werner : 2005), argue that highway tariffs 
should reflect the initial lump sum and maintenance costs, plus a minor remuneration for the operating 
company. In his opinion, the construction costs have been largely covered over the years and the current 
maintenance costs do not justify the current tariff level. Therefore, he supports the argument that tariffs 
should be significantly reduced. 
                                                            
23 http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2006/ottobre/08/Autostrade_soci_rivolta_governo_ora_co_9_061008023.shtml  
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However, as Gian Maria Gros Pietro, President of Autostrade, reported in 2005, the average eurocent per 
kilometer tariff in Italy is the lowest both for trucks and cars among large European countries, and among the 
Italian highway concessionaires, Autostrade presents an average tariff well below the national level.
25 
 
The Tariff System and the Price Cap 
 
Each year the concessionaire can draw a proposal on its required tariff variation, which is communicated to 
the MEF and MIT, and discussed in the Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Programming (CIPE) in 
which both the ministries sit. This body decides on the pricing system according to the following price-cap 
method: 
 
                  
 
which states that the percentage increase in that specific highway tariff (  ) is equal to the government 
planned inflation rate (  ) minus a productivity index ( ) to which is added a quality index  (   ). The 
productivity index is determined specifically for each concessionaire every five years according to the 
expected productivity variation (linked to investments) and in order to guarantee the financial capability of 
the enterprise. The   determination is based on the following concessionaire-specific variables: a congruous 
capital remuneration based on the weighted average capital cost (WACC), future investment projects, 
productivity goals and expected demand (traffic). The quality index is determined weighing the average 
paving quality and an accident rate. These two variables are difficult to deal with: the former can only be 
evaluated holistically (defining quality with the material composition) and the latter is dependent on country-
wide effects (number of police controls, alcohol sales, and speed regulation) not imputable to the 
concessionaire. Measurement of most of these variables is the responsibility of ANAS and other public 
institutions (MIT and police). 
 
However, the taxonomy of highway tariff regulation is more complex. For example, the independent 
authority on market and competition (Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato - Antitrust) can 
intervene and has done so over the years. The same is true for the authority that oversees public contracts 
(Autorità per la vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture). Other judicial bodies 
responsible for public expenditure control have been called in (Consiglio di Stato and Corte dei Conti) and 
even the European Commission Directorate on Competition had a say on the general tariff mechanism. 
 
Box 5. The Complicated Plan to Sell Autostrade.  The government plan to sell Autostrade started in the 
mid-1990s because of public finance constraints, but moved very slowly toward realization because of many 
legal incidents caused by the sophisticated regulatory system. The first stop occurred in 1996, when the MEF 
was forced by Law to ask the Administrative Supreme Council (Consiglio di Stato) whether for the 
Autostrade privatization to occur, a new independent authority was needed.
26 The Consiglio di Stato stated 
that there was no need for an independent authority or a golden share held by the government, if both MIT 
and MEF implemented regulation procedures and a hard-core of private shareholders stepped in. The 
Consiglio di Stato indication of a limited shareholder hard-core was aimed at the introduction of a large 
public shareholder group, which would have created external public control of the company; as the former 
President of ANAS, Giancarlo Valori, stated “the introduction of a hard-core will prevent the sale to 
privates only keen on the financial convenience of the company.”
27 Notwithstanding this, such a constraint 
                                                            
25 For the discussion between Gros Pietro and Marco Ponti, refer to http://www.lavoce.info/articoli/pagina1854.html  
26 http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1996/settembre/06/ora_Iri_avvia_cessione_Seat_co_0_96090610973.shtml  
27 http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1999/07/02/autostrade-necessario-il-nocciolo-duro.html  12 
 
was not be respected, because prominent political figures agreed (or were willing not to create any judicial 
problem) in order to secure the Autostrade’s largest shareholders. So in 2003 the initial hard-core 
shareholders expanded from 30 to 50.1 percent, eluding the fundamental mechanism meant by the Consiglio 
di Stato for its opening to privates. The second stop occurred in 1997 and was due to Corte dei Conti, which 
blocked the privatization for two reasons: the first was that by contract Autostrade (publically managed) had 
a concession until 2018, but the ministerial measure under attack was both extending it to 2038 and 
implementing the privatization. The main point was that the expansion of the concession had to occur 
through a tender (at the end of 2018) and could not be imposed by a ministerial act (which in the Italian legal 
system is much less important than a law of parliament, which could have made it possible). The second 
point, which warned the Corte, was the introduction of a vast investment plan, for which no financial 
coverage was identified in the law and as a public finance judiciary, it could not avoid stopping the law.
28 
The government passed this block after a complicated technical and judicial confrontation with the Corte dei 
Conti, which ended up signing the measure in the financial registers of the state with reservation. However, 
in 1998 a new stop to the sale occurred because both the Italian Antitrust
29 and the European Commission 
Directorate on Competition
30 asked for the revision of the 2038 concession extension.  Because of the 
European Treaties on the Economic Community, the government was forced to intervene and solve this 
conflict, reacting the following deal: the privatized part of Autostrade would only be responsible for the 
management and maintenance of the highway and some of its technical services would be the responsibility 
of a different public company.
31 In the same year, this “infinite story” seemed to be experiencing a new stop 
because Consob (the stock surveillance authority) noticed some suspicious pre-privatization fluctuations of 
Autostrade shares,
32 especially linked with the “privatization breaks” caused by Consiglio di Stato, Corte dei 
Conti, Antitrust and EU DG on competition. This caused a new slowdown and an investigation for insider 
trading, which alarmed the markets and the public authorities. 
 
 
Final Considerations  
 
The Italian highway PPP experience is very complex and contains some positive elements amid several 
concerning points. Inevitably the new cycle of investments favored some remarkable quality gains and 
sparked a needed expansion of infrastructure. However, many issues need to be critically analyzed. The first 
is the “privatize now and regulate later” approach, which has proven to be detrimental to public welfare, as 
most of the public organizations have argued in their collective request for a stricter reform on tariff 
regulation and concession provision. 
 
Table 4 reports the formidable rise in the profitability of Autostrade between 2004 and 2008. The NARS (a 
technical body of CIPE) is very critical regarding the behaviors of this large group and has asked for a 
profound revision of the tariff mechanism and a tougher regulation process. In its 2007 report, it argued that 
more than 80 percent of the concessionaires have implemented only a small percentage of the scheduled 
investments and have gained impressive profits by obtaining public subsidies while delaying the investments 
that these should have financed.
33 In its 2008 report, ANAS states that “by analyzing the December 31, 2008 
concessionaire balance sheet, aggregate investment was 1,676 million euros, against a contractually planned 
                                                            
28 http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1997/10/28/stop-della-corte-dei-conti-alla-vendita.html  





32 http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1998/febbraio/24/Insider_Autostrade_magistratura_indaga_co_0_9802245722.shtml  
33 Relazione al Cipe sull’Attività svolta dal NARS nel 2007, pages 16 to 24. 13 
 
figure of 1,977 million.”
34 In the same report, ANAS states that all of the concessionaires guaranteed to fill 
this gap, by allocating “investment reserves” (reserve vincolate di capitale) to the missing part and 
implementing such investments in the next fiscal year. Although this is a soft, constructive and fine-free 
solution, it allows concessionaires to speculate on this permanent one-year delay and can provide them with 
a fictional financial capacity given by the non-synchronized movement between investment and proceeds.  
 
 
Table 4: Autostrade Ebit
35 
Year  Million euro  % of stock 
capitalization 
2004  1,454   0.1290 
2005  1,536   0.1326 
2006  1,606   0.1248 
2007  1,643   0.1108 
2008  1,616   0.2157 
 
Source: Autostrade and Atlantia balance sheets between 2004 and 2008. 
 
A further aspect that may hinder competition is the concession renewal mechanism. In fact, the current state 
of the art makes it sufficient for the current concession holder to agree with ANAS on a future investment 
plan, in order to secure the renewal of the concession for the duration of the current concession. This risks 
petrifying the market and avoiding the entrance of more competitive concessionaires. 
 
Another major problem in the highway regulation is the overlap of too many independent and political 
authorities, which by themselves are neither specifically designed for this complex process nor to collect 
sufficient independent information. This ends up creating a confusing and dissuasive business environment. 
It is enough to think that before Autostrade was given the right to obtain a tariff adjustment for the difference 
between the expected and realized inflation rate, two years and some six authorities were involved in the 
decision process (ANAS, Consiglio di Stato
36, Autorità per la vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi 
e forniture, NARS, MEF and MIT
37) before a decisive statement by the Consiglio di Stato solved the 
situation. 
 
                                                            
34 The reports states, in Italian, that “La spesa per investimenti, nelle more delle approvazioni dei progetti di bilancio per 
l’anno 2008, sostenuta dalle società concessionarie autostradali per investimenti, rilevata dai dati di contabilità analitica 
al 31 dicembre 2008, è risultata pari a 1.674 €/Milioni (escluso CAS), a fronte di una previsione di piano di 1.977 
€/milioni corrispondente all’86percent,” refer to ANAS 2008 reports, available at 
http://www.stradeanas.it/index.php?/content/index/arg/dati_di_bilancio   




37 Please refer to Autorità per la vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture, Relazione 2007, Pag 172, 
176, 177. 14 
 
In addition to this, the fact that ANAS, the agency in charge of controls (over traffic, quality and other tariff-
relevant variables), is itself a concessionaire, supervises contracts, participates in the concession provision 
and, most of all, is a shareholder in some of the private companies which itself regulates, casts significant 
doubts on the effectiveness of its regulation and control powers. 
 
For this reason, in 2006, 40 MPs presented a proposal to create a national independent authority of highway 
and transport concessions, ANCAT (Autorità nazionale delle concessioni autostradali e dei trasporti), which 
would have acquired all the responsibilities on this matter, from concession provision, to supervision, control 
and enforcement. The proposal did not get sufficient backing in Parliament and was rejected; however, it is 
interesting to report that the same MPs recognized that “public intervention in the highway sector has been 
characterized by deference toward concessionaires,” at the point of “ignoring – as claimed by the Corte dei 
Conti – the concessionaire’s contractual obligations regarding investments, ordinary and extraordinary 
maintenance, and continuing to pour large public grants and favorable tariff regulation.”
38 Their argument 
in favor of a much more stringent regulation is very tough: “this law proposal comes to secure the respect of 
the legality principle and to bring back fairness and transparency in a sector (…) progressively occupied by 
privates who operate without any substantial risk.”  In the same section of the proposal, they focus on a 
fundamental comparison: “the absence of enterprise risk caused a progressive abandonment of 
entrepreneurs of other industrial and economic sectors, in order to embrace the so-called “utilities.” These 
entrepreneurs used to be the engine of Italian competitiveness, but have ceased to be because, attraction by 
this unregulated market, characterized by a low risk, a substantial monopolistic position and enormous 
advantages at the expense of the State and consumers.” They state that this “sector displacement” was 
mainly caused by the “enormous public resources to concessionaires (through tariffs, grants, other service 
monopolies, etc) quantifiable at 50 billion euro” and that “such investment would have allowed the state to 
build and operate a larger highway network with remarkable financial gains, as stated by Corte dei Conti.” 
 
Attention should also be paid to the highway concessionaire market structure: the establishment of a de facto 
duopoly of private groups in a sector with massive long-run investments and the exorbitant capital 
requirements is going to be detrimental when concessions will be renegotiated. In fact, unless concessions 
are broken into smaller pieces, few companies will dispose of sufficient financial capability to be 
competitive with Atlantia and Gavio group. This certainly requires an investigation regarding whether there 
exists increasing scale economies in highway concessions, and we hope that this will be done in the coming 
years. 
 
In conclusion, because cuts in public debt have been the reason behind the opening of concessions to the 
private sector, the need to create a congruous and remunerative group (Autostrade) outstripped the issue of 
regulation and control. While this initial problem could be attributed to inexperience in independent 
regulation, the persistence of a politically-biased and strong lobby-influenced decision-making process has 
proven to be detrimental for competition in this sector. A related problem seems to be the excess of 
incentives and the unbalanced position favoring private groups, for example through large public grants, 
friendly controls and lately subsidies on interest rates. 
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